For over forty years, from 1948 to 1990, South Africa was in conflict with both the international community and international law. Apartheid, premised on race discrimination and the denial of human rights, was contrary both to the law of the UN Charter and to the norms of human rights, non-discrimination and self-determination generated by the post-World War II order. Although South Africa's foreign policy during this period was highly legalistic, it was the old law of state sovereignty and absolute respect for domestic jurisdiction that guided and shaped it So it was that South Africa became a pariah state within the international community; a delinquent state in the context of the 'new' international law of human rights. Domestically, international law fared little better. Although treaties were incorporated into municipal law, in accordance with the common law dualist approach, and customary international law was treated as part of municipal law, unless inconsistent with legislation, the hostility of successive apartheid governments to the United Nations and international human rights conventions undoubtedly influenced the attitudes of legislators, judges and lawyers. International law received no constitutional recognition and was largely ignored by the courts and lawyers. While international law was applied by the courts in politically neutral matters, such as sovereign immunity and diplomatic privileges, it was generally viewed as an alien and hostile legal order.
The recognition of customary international law in section 232 also has implications for the debate over the conflict between stare decisis and new rules of customary international law. In Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria 9 Lord Denning M.R.
10 and Shaw LJ. 1 ' held that the doctrine of precedent could not be invoked as an obstacle to the application of a changed rule of international law, in casu the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity instead of the absolute doctrine. Although there is judicial support for this view in South Africa, 12 its correctness is not fully accepted. 13 Section 232, however, gives support to the rule enunciated in Trendtex as it is 'customary international law' per se, and not customary international law as previously applied by South African courts, that is 'law in the Republic'.
Section 231 (4) of the Interim Constitution provided that 'the rules of customary international law binding on the Republic shall, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament, form part of the law of the Republic' (emphasis added). The omission of the word 'binding' from the 19% Constitution has led one commentator to argue that all rules of customary international law, including those to which South Africa may have 'persistently objected', are part of municipal law. 14 This, so it is argued, accords with a 1995 dictum of the Constitutional Court that the reference to international law in the Bill of Rights (discussed below) 'includes nonbinding law as well'.
15
The better view is that the word 'binding' was dropped from the 19% Constitution on the grounds that it was considered to be unnecessary and, indeed, tautologous. 16 As far as South Africa is concerned, a practice to which it has persistently objected is simply not a customary rule. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the omission of the word 'binding' will facilitate the proof of customary international law. Early South African decisions hold that only those rules of customary international law that have been universally recognized by states form part of South African law, 17 while later decisions hold that general acceptance is sufficient 18 The omission of the word 'binding', with its undertones of consent, paves the way for a 9 [1977] QB 529 (CA 
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The clear purpose of the Interim Constitution was to facilitate the incorporation of treaties into municipal law. The drafters of the Interim Constitution, however, failed to take account of the bureaucratic mind. Government departments required to scrutinize treaties before they were submitted to Parliament refused to present treaties to Parliament for ratification until they were completely satisfied that there would be no conflict between the provisions of the treaty and domestic law. The result was that few treaties were presented to Parliament expeditiously. The parliamentary procedures for dealing with treaties have further delayed ratification. In these circumstances the drafters of the 19% Constitution elected to return to the pre-1994 position relating to the incorporation of treaties, without abandoning the need for parliamentary ratification of treaties. Section 231 provides:
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive. Great care is taken to ensure that the Bill of Rights complies with international norms. Although the rights are formulated in simpler language than that found in most human rights conventions, in pursuance of a deliberate policy to make the Constitution accessible to the people, the rights are broadly modelled on their international counterparts. In part this was done in order to facilitate South Africa's accession to international human rights treaties. Moreover, some of the clauses in the 1996 Constitution refer expressly to international law. Section 37(4) provides that any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that, inter alia, the legislation 'is consistent with the Republic's obligations under international law applicable to states of emergency'. Section 35(3X1) recognizes the right 'not to be convicted of an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time when it was committed or omitted*.
The clearest evidence of the desire to achieve harmony between South African and international human rights jurisprudence is provided by section 39(1) (previously section 35 (1) This provision, together with section 233, which requires a court when interpreting legislation to 'prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law', ensures that courts will be guided by international norms and the interpretation placed upon these norms by international courts and other institutions. recognition of the notion of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation (emphasis added).
While the purpose of this provision is to hold out hope to disaffected communities of a greater degree of territorial or community autonomy, it is not impossible that future secessionist groups may seize upon the phrase 'or in any other way' to justify their claim to external self-determination.
VII. Amnesty
Although the South African Constitution strives to ensure compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law, there is one area in which it is possibly out of line with international law. This is in respect of amnesty.
Today it is argued with growing conviction that customary international law requires a successor regime to prosecute and punish members of the previous regime who had been guilty of egregious human rights violations. 'postamble' to the Constitution constituted a bridge from apartheid to democracy and that it trumped section 22. Consequently the amnesty legislation was constitutional. Although die judgment of the Constitutional Court, written in moving and eloquent language by Deputy President Mahomed, accurately captures the intention of the two parties responsible for the amnesty compact contained in the 'postamble', and is probably correct as a matter of constitutional interpretation, it is disappointing from die perspective of international law.
Conclusion
The 19% South African Constitution, like the Interim Constitution of 1993, seeks to ensure that South African law will evolve in accordance with international law. The legal profession and the judiciary, which during the apartheid era made little use of international law, have generally responded positively. Law libraries have acquired international law materials and arguments are frequently made in the language of international law, particularly in the field of human rights. Judges in both the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court have not hesitated to invoke international law to support their findings. That international law is still unfamiliar terrain to the courts, however, is illustrated by the AZAPO case. Inevitably, it will take time for South African lawyers and judges to become fully conversant with the sources, rules and reasoning of international law. The Constitution which serves as the foundation stone for the new South Africa will ensure that this happens.
